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NOTE
BENEATH OCEANS, AIRSTRIPS, AND SPORTS




The First Amendment provides sanctuary for unpopular forms of
speech, but its protections are not absolute.  One hotbed issue in recent
years involves the degree to which adult entertainment speech merits
protection in light of the municipal zoning prerogative.  Under the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence, a zoning law must leave open “reasonable
alternative avenues of communication” for such expression to take
place; yet federal jurisdictions have split over the relevant timeframe for
assessing the adequacy of these alternative sites: should the analysis fo-
cus on the circumstances that exist at the time the ordinance is enacted
or at the time it is challenged?  This dispute, although simply stated,
implicates a host of profound concerns such as the philosophical justifi-
cation for a free speech right, the proper means by which that right (as
enshrined in the constitutional text) should be interpreted, the judiciary’s
role in refereeing the protections afforded by that right, and the desira-
ble bounds of majoritarian action in this sphere (as a policy matter).
Negative theory—a mode of constitutional interpretation that justifies the
protection of speech by focusing on the pitfalls of government regula-
tion—is a normatively ideal solution to this timeframe debate and sug-
gests the embrace of a time-of-enactment regime.  Furthermore, we can
use the principles of negative theory to construct a sound blueprint for
safeguarding the municipal zoning power.
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INTRODUCTION
Rousseau observed amidst the deceptive calm of prerevolutionary
France that “[m]an is born free, and he is everywhere in chains.”1  Per-
haps in similar spirit, today’s First Amendment advocate might lament
that man is born naked and yet is everywhere in clothes.  The freedom of
speech represents one of America’s hallmark values, yet delineating its
proper scope can be a tricky business; it is a task that demands mastery
over those twin judicial arts: distinction-drawing2 and the balancing of
rights against harms.3  In this regard, perhaps the hottest arena of recent
controversy features the expressive rights of adult entertainment busi-
nesses pitted against the prerogative of local governments to regulate the
time, place, and manner of that expression through zoning.4
1 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. I, at 49 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
2 Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(“In order for . . . school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
[they] must be able to show that [their] action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point.”), with Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’ . . . .”).  A
bedrock distinction employed by the Court to evaluate speech restrictions is that of time, place,
and manner. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1941).
3 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre . . . .”).
4 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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The Second Circuit recently faced one such case in TJS of New
York, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, which considered the zoning ordinance
of a Long Island town that restricted the locations available to adult en-
tertainment businesses.5  As mandated by the Supreme Court in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., a zoning ordinance that restricts where
adult entertainment businesses can operate must leave open “reasonable
alternative avenues of communication” for such expression to take place
within the municipality.6 TJS, however, featured an unresolved deriva-
tive question: is the availability of those alternative sites to be evaluated
at the time the zoning ordinance is enacted or at the time it is being
challenged?7  The Second Circuit resolved this issue by embracing the
latter, time-of-challenge option; yet in so doing, the court acknowledged
that its holding was apparently at odds with two other federal jurisdic-
tions,8 namely the Eleventh Circuit and the District of Maryland.9
This dispute over the inquiry’s relevant timeframe—an “interesting
and surprisingly unanswered question,” according to the Second Cir-
cuit10—raises profound issues regarding both the philosophical justifica-
tion for a free speech right as well as the proper judicial role in
preserving that right.  At the outset of our investigation, however, it is
important to clarify what constitutes “adult entertainment” for the pur-
poses of this Note.  The operative definition used herein is drawn from
the zoning ordinance at issue in TJS:
A public or private establishment which presents topless
dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators, exotic
dancers or other similar entertainments and which estab-
lishment is customarily not open to the public generally
and excludes any minor by reason of age.  This includes
adult massage parlors, peep shows and adult theaters and
similar types of businesses.11
As a starting point for this analysis, the jurisprudence that has
emerged from the federal circuit courts in the wake of Renton articulates
a critical limitation on the “alternative avenues” requirement.  The case
law makes clear, on the one hand, that a qualifying site cannot be so
blatantly unfeasible as to be, say, underwater or beneath a sports sta-
5 598 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2010).
6 Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
7 TJS, 598 F.3d at 18–19.
8 See id. at 24.
9 See Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, Fla., 490 F.3d 860 (11th Cir.
2007); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 256 F. Supp.
2d 385 (D. Md. 2003).
10 TJS, 598 F.3d at 18.
11 Id. at 30 n.1.
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dium;12 at the same time, however, the case law makes equally certain—
building off of the self-limiting language of Renton itself13—that the al-
ternative venues a municipality must provide do not have to be commer-
cially viable or even economically feasible.14  The impression one
receives, therefore, is that the alternative avenues requirement, as con-
strued by Renton and its progeny, is not a de facto-focused mandate that
compels a municipality to guarantee a set quantity of actual sites but
rather a more modest dictate for the preservation of theoretical space.15
This Note contends that Renton’s limitation on the alternative ave-
nues requirement is eminently compatible with—and indeed, best ex-
plained by—a so-called “negative theory” of the First Amendment.
Negative theory premises the sanctity of free speech not on any particu-
lar positive good that is secured through speech but rather on the special
dangers attaching to the government’s improper regulation of it.16  In
other words, what guides the negative constitutional analysis is whether
the government’s motive for placing a given restriction on speech is
proper.17  This Note thus advocates for applying a negative framework to
resolve the jurisdictional quarrel at hand.  Specifically, this Note argues
that negative theory yields an interpretive rejoinder to the Second Cir-
cuit’s TJS ruling and favors evaluating constitutionality at the time of
enactment.
Part I of this Note sketches the operative case law on the topic.
Subsection I.A explores the parameters of the alternative avenues re-
quirement and the implications of Renton’s self-limiting language as it
has been applied in the federal circuits.  Subsection I.B zooms inward to
investigate the specific jurisdictional dispute at hand by summarizing the
authorities lined up on both sides.  Part II then introduces negative theory
as a mode of First Amendment interpretation.  Subsection II.A provides a
descriptive account of the theory’s doctrinal underpinnings, and Subsec-
tion II.B discusses the historical and philosophical realities that render
negative theory normatively optimal as a mode of constitutional analysis.
Part III then applies this theory to the present controversy.  Subsection
III.A examines how negative theory convincingly accounts for the fed-
eral judiciary’s approach in other First Amendment contexts and pro-
ceeds to apply the theory to the sphere of adult entertainment businesses,
offering a resolution to the jurisdictional split highlighted in TJS.  Sub-
section III.B then goes on to employ the negative framework to suggest a
12 See, e.g., Topanga Press v. Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993).
13 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
14 See, e.g., Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1995).
15 See infra note 56 and accompanying text. R
16 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 80–81 (1982).
17 See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 15–16 (1989).
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blueprint for safeguarding municipal zoning rights justified as a defense
of majoritarian processes and rooted in the value of legislative repose.  A
brief Conclusion follows.
I. THE “ALTERNATIVE AVENUES” TIMEFRAME DEBATE
A. The Evolution of the Court’s “Alternative Avenues” Jurisprudence
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”18  So reads the First Amendment, whose hallowed protec-
tions have been incorporated against the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19  Yet delineating the scope of this
succinct command has often proven difficult, especially amidst the tech-
nological boom of the twentieth century that gave rise to a new array of
expressive mediums.20  The Supreme Court responded to this challenge
by broadly extending constitutional coverage to art forms such as motion
pictures, television and radio broadcasts, and live stage performances.21
The Court also emphasized that the mere display of nudity “does not
place [this] otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First
Amendment.”22  As a result, adult entertainment expression qualifies as
protected speech under the First Amendment and is immunized from out-
right silencing by the government.23
The protection afforded to adult entertainment is not unlimited,
however: the second edge of the constitutional sword, concomitantly
sharpened by the Court’s jurisprudence, is the municipal prerogative to
subject that industry to stringent regulation through zoning.24  The Court
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
20 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65–66 (1981) (string-citing a
progression of cases where the First Amendment was applied to new communicative
mediums).
21 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding the content of
motion pictures to be subject to First Amendment protection); Schacht v. United States, 398
U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (holding the content of live stage performances to be subject to First
Amendment protection); Schad, 452 U.S. at 65 (“[M]otion pictures, programs broadcast by
radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within
the First Amendment guarantee.”). See generally Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium . . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes
by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.”).
22 Schad, 452 U.S. at 66; see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213
(1975) (finding that mere nudity does not itself constitute obscenity and thus invalidating a
municipal ordinance that banned all films depicting nudity).
23 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000) (classifying nude
dancing as expressive conduct that is “entitled to some quantum of protection under the First
Amendment”).
24 One analysis identifies California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114–16 (1972) as the gene-
sis of this jurisprudence, wherein the Court held under the Twenty-first Amendment that mu-
nicipalities could ban nude dancing in establishments where alcoholic beverages were being
sold. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment Rights: The
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first endorsed this prerogative in Young v. American Mini Theatres
(1976), where it upheld a Detroit ordinance that prohibited adult theaters
from locating within 500 feet of a residential zone or within 1,000 feet of
any two other “regulated uses.”25  Writing on behalf of the plurality, Jus-
tice Stevens affirmed the propriety of imposing special location-specific
burdens on adult theaters by categorizing such requirements as valid re-
strictions on time, place, and manner.26  Justice Stevens anchored this
view in a determination that adult entertainment speech fell outside the
core nucleus of First Amendment protections (unlike, for example, politi-
cal speech), so as to render it susceptible to being outweighed by coun-
tervailing government interests.27  In sum, Young held that although the
First Amendment assuredly prevents municipalities from suppressing
adult entertainment speech altogether, they could nonetheless “legiti-
mately use the content of [those] materials as the basis for placing them
in a different classification from other motion pictures.”28
Young’s critical pronouncement—that municipalities could target
the ancillary effects of speech, which naturally inhere by virtue of what
that speech is (and are thus eminently bound up with the content of that
speech), without discriminating against such speech on the basis of its
content29—set the stage for subsequent elaboration of how local govern-
ments might wield the zoning power to curb adult entertainment.  Five
years after Young, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the Court
struck down a New Jersey borough’s ordinance banning all forms of live
entertainment,30 which was precisely the sort of “total suppression” that
Young proscribed.31  In so holding, however, the Court reemphasized
that the municipal prerogative to regulate speech-related land use was
“undoubtedly broad”32 and once again fastened this power to a concern
over the speech’s peripheral impact, noting how the exercise of zoning
Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 287,
294–95 (2004).
25 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976).
26 See id. at 71–72 (plurality opinion).
27 See id. at 70 (plurality opinion) (“[E]ven though . . . the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials . . . it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate . . . .  [F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters
off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the
theaters of our choice.”).
28 Id. at 70–71 (plurality opinion).
29 See id. (plurality opinion).
30 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981).
31 Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion).
32 Schad, 452 U.S. at 68.
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authority was an “essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of
life.”33
Five more years passed before the Supreme Court decided City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres and set forth the operative test for analyzing
the constitutionality of a law that restricts the sites available to adult en-
tertainment businesses.34  There, the Court upheld an ordinance that pro-
hibited adult theaters from being located within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, family dwelling, church, park, or school.35  Because this
law did not constitute an outright ban (in contrast to Schad), the Court,
citing Young, analyzed it under the framework of time, place, and man-
ner restrictions.36  With this threshold distinction drawn, Justice Rehn-
quist, for the Court, located the primary analytical fault-line with the
existence (or lack thereof) of content discrimination: laws inhibiting
adult entertainment speech on the basis of its content (however under-
stood) “presumptively violate the First Amendment.”37  If, however, an
ordinance is facially content-neutral, it will be upheld so long as (1) it is
“designed to serve a substantial governmental interest” and (2) it does
not “unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”38
Renton’s identification of content neutrality as the analytical pivot
for this inquiry draws its decisiveness from how the Court then pro-
ceeded to articulate the meaning of that term.  Justice Brennan, in dis-
sent, disputed that the “content-neutral” label even applied to the law at
hand, noting that the restrictions pertained exclusively to businesses
voicing a particular form of speech (sexually explicit films).39  The ma-
jority, however, embraced a broader definition of neutrality, grounded
not on the law’s consequent impact but rather on the scienter that lay
behind its enactment.  While conceding that the Renton ordinance sin-
gled out adult theaters for special treatment, the Court rejected Justice
Brennan’s conclusion that doing so thereby rendered it content-based40
and asserted that content neutrality exists whenever an ordinance can be
33 Id. (“Where property interests are adversely affected by zoning, the courts generally
have emphasized the breadth of municipal power to control land use and have sustained the
regulation if it is rationally related to legitimate state concerns . . . .”).  Echoing this point is
Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion).
34 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).
35 Id. at 43.
36 See id. at 46 (“The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, does
not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located
within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or
school.  The ordinance is therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner
regulation.”).
37 Id. at 46–47; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (reaffirm-
ing this principle).
38 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
39 See id. at 57–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 47.
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“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”41
Armed with this definition, the Court hereupon invoked the critical pro-
nouncement of Young and found Renton’s ordinance to be content-neu-
tral because, by its own terms, it was aimed “not at the content of the
films shown . . . but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community.”42
The upshot of Renton’s scienter-focused scrutiny is that a zoning
law enacted with the self-stated aim of curtailing the harmful secondary
effects of adult entertainment thereby secures for itself the coveted status
of content neutrality,43 which, in turn, shields it from constitutional chal-
lenge (subject to satisfying Renton’s two-part test).44  Subsequent case
law from the federal circuits has recognized “secondary effects” to en-
compass, inter alia, the prevention of crime, the maintenance of property
values, and the preservation of residential quality of life.45
Critical for our purposes, however, is how the Court cabined the
scope of the “alternative avenues” prong of its test.  The Renton plaintiffs
contested the adequacy of the venues preserved under the ordinance by
arguing that most of the sites identified by the Court in its determination
that the second prong had been met were either not in fact available or
else commercially non-viable.46  The Court, however, brushed aside this
contention by explaining that a municipality’s obligation under the re-
quirement was far more limited: “[W]e have never suggested that the
First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters,
or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be
able to obtain sites at bargain prices.”47  Adult entertainment businesses,
the Court continued, “must fend for themselves in the real estate market,
on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers.”48  In sum, the
Court concluded, “the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open
and operate an adult theater within the city.”49
41 Id. at 48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 48–49.
43 See, e.g., id. at 48 (“The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect
the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, . . . not to suppress the expression of unpopular
views.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (“[T]he ordinance does not
attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of
watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public
health, safety, and welfare.”).
44 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
45 See, e.g., Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
46 Renton, 475 U.S. at 53–54.
47 Id. at 54 (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
48 Id.
49 Id. (emphasis added).
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The full implications of Renton’s self-imposed caveat are elucidated
by investigating the lower federal jurisprudence that has emerged to ad-
dress the adequacy of alternative avenues.  Four major tenets emerge.
First, building directly off of Renton’s language, a site’s commercial via-
bility or economic feasibility is irrelevant to the First Amendment analy-
sis.50  As a corollary, the mere fact that a given site might require some
additional development to render it suitable for adult entertainment busi-
nesses does not necessarily disqualify that site.51  According to the Elev-
enth Circuit, “[e]xamples of impediments to the relocation of an adult
business that may not be of a constitutional magnitude include having to
build a new facility instead of moving into an existing building; having
to clean up waste or landscape a site; bearing the costs of generally appli-
cable lighting, parking, or green space requirements; making [do] with
less space than one desired; or having to purchase a larger lot than one
needs.”52
A second tenet that emerges, closely linked to Renton’s apathy to-
ward economic feasibility, is a liberal conception of what types of venues
pass constitutional muster.  On the one hand, “the finder of fact may
exclude land under the ocean, airstrips of international airports, [and]
sports stadiums.”53  Short of these intuitive extremes, however, courts
have readily deemed acceptable sites that are functionally undesirable
such as industrial or manufacturing zones, even when these districts are
the sole venues left open under the ordinance.54
Third, the behavior of private actors is wholly irrelevant to the First
Amendment inquiry.  Courts have repeatedly stressed that it is of no im-
port if sites deemed part of the general commercial real estate market are
50 See, e.g., Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 871 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he economic feasibility of relocating to a site is not a First Amendment concern.”
(quoting David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000)));
Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Topanga Press, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is not relevant whether a
relocation site will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove to be commer-
cially infeasible for an adult business.”); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278, 283
(8th Cir. 1991).
51 See David Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1334.
52 Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 871 (alteration in original) (quoting David Vincent, 200
F.3d at 1334–35).
53 Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1124 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Topanga Press,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993)); accord David Vincent, Inc.
v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000).
54 See Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2007) (up-
holding an ordinance that restricted adult entertainment businesses to industrial zones); Z.J.
Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 685–87 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); see also
Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[L]and that is already
occupied by commercial and manufacturing facilities and undeveloped land that is not for sale
or lease is not to be automatically deemed unavailable.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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currently occupied by other businesses, even if such sites are held by
private owners who are explicitly unwilling to sell to sexually oriented
businesses.55
Finally, as a fortiori from the preceding tenets, the alternative ave-
nue requirement really imposes a burden upon municipalities to secure
theoretical, as opposed to de facto, alternative sites.56  The inquiry is
focused solely on physical and legal availability—that is, whether the
proffered venues are part of an actual commercial real estate market.57
Mere acreage hardly plays a role in the analysis, as ordinances are fre-
quently upheld notwithstanding leaving less than one percent of the land
within the city’s limits available.58  Significantly, however, this down-
sized requirement of theoretical space is tempered by an implied condi-
tion of good faith on the part of the municipality.  According to the Ninth
Circuit, “[A]lthough Renton stressed that the First Amendment only re-
quires a relocation site to be potentially available rather than actually
available, the requirement of potentiality connotes genuine possibility.”59
55 See David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2000);
Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Bronco’s Entm’t,
Ltd. v. Charter Twp. of Van Buren, 421 F.3d 440, 452 (6th Cir. 2005) (including in its assess-
ment of available alternative sites those currently occupied or held by private owners who
might be unwilling to sell to sexually oriented businesses).
56 See North Ave. Novelties v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The
constitution does not mandate that any minimum percentage of land be made available for
certain types of speech.  What it does require is that zoning schemes that regulate the location
of speech provide a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to disseminate the speech at issue.”); Topanga
Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing how the
First Amendment requires only that a relocation site be “potentially available rather than actu-
ally available”); see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult En-
tertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 479 & n.147 (2004).  Indeed, the
preceding language of Topanga Press is quoted by the Second Circuit in TJS itself. See TJS of
N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 27 (2d Cir. 2010).
57 See TJS, 598 F.3d at 27 (citing Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 106–07); cf. Woodall v. City of
El Paso, 950 F.2d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[L]and cannot be found to be reasonably availa-
ble if its physical or legal characteristics made it impossible for any adult business to locate
there.”).
58 See, e.g., Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1240 (10th Cir.
2002), rev’d on other grounds, City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774
(2004) (upholding an ordinance that left available “just under” one percent of the city’s land);
North Ave. Novelties v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding an ordi-
nance that left open “less than one percent” of the land within the city limits); M.J. Entm’t
Enters. v. City of Mount Vernon, 328 F. Supp. 2d 480, 485, 488–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting
summary judgment to city-defendant where its zoning ordinance left open .67% of the land
within the city limits zoned for commercial use).
59 Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1531; see also Isbell v. City of San Diego, 258 F.3d 1108,
1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the city-defendant’s list of potential sites suffered from a
“fatal flaw” in that it failed to account for the city’s own 1,000-foot spacing requirements);
Lim v. City of Long Beach, 217 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The city’s duty to demon-
strate the availability of properties is defined, at a bare minimum, by reasonableness and good
faith.”); Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 822 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing, as one of
several factors that a court should analyze when determining whether an adult business has a
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The significance of this final tenet will become apparent when the con-
tours of negative theory are discussed in Part II.
B. The Timeframe Dispute
In TJS of New York v. Town of Smithtown, the Second Circuit con-
fronted an “interesting and surprisingly unanswered question”60 pertain-
ing to the alternative avenues requirement, namely “whether the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance should only be evaluated with
regard to the alternative avenues of communication it leaves open at the
time it is passed, or also those it leaves open at the time it is chal-
lenged.”61  At issue in that case was a run-of-the-mill ordinance enacted
by a town in Long Island, New York that restricted the sites available to
adult entertainment businesses to certain industrial and commercial dis-
tricts and also imposed a 500-foot spacing requirement.62  Writing for the
court, Judge Calabresi answered his self-posed query by embracing the
time-of-challenge option and thereby vacated an earlier judgment of the
Eastern District of New York (E.D.N.Y.) that was premised on the oppo-
site view.63
The Second Circuit offered several justifications for why it en-
dorsed the time-of-challenge position.  First, Judge Calabresi emphasized
the need for courts to render their verdicts in conformity with the “cir-
cumstances as they exist at the time the court issues its judgment, or as
close as is practicable to that time.”64  This view was in turn critically
hinged upon a conviction that “the First Amendment does not allow
courts to ignore post-enactment, extralegal changes.”65  In so pronounc-
ing, the Second Circuit lent its blessing to an ever-evolving, fluid ar-
rangement wherein a law’s constitutionality might wax and wane with
the emergence or decline of available sites: a once-constitutional enact-
ment might cease to be so upon the vanishing of enough such sites, while
conversely, “if a municipality opens up new land to development, the
availability of alternative sites might very well increase, . . . thus render-
ing constitutional zoning ordinances previously enacted.”66  A second
reasonable opportunity to open and operate, “the goals of the city plan”); Univ. Books &
Videos v. Miami–Dade Cnty., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011, 1014 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (striking
down a zoning ordinance where a number of proffered relocation sites could not be used due to
the spacing requirements established by the county’s own ordinance).
60 TJS, 598 F.3d at 18.
61 Id. at 18–19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id. at 19–20.
63 Id. at 19 (vacating the judgment of TJS of New York v. Town of Smithtown, No.
03CV4407, 2008 WL 2079044, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008), which had evaluated the
adequacy of alternative sites existing “on the date of enactment”).
64 Id. at 23.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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justification offered by the court was that such a concern for the “contin-
uing impact of zoning regulations . . . as applied, rather than on their
facial constitutionality when passed,” was most faithful to the spirit of
Renton.67  Finally, Judge Calabresi defended his time-of-challenge elec-
tion by issuing a normative pronouncement on the intrinsic value of free
speech itself: “If the only relevant question were whether an ordinance
provided adequate alternatives on the day of its passage, any law that did
so would thereafter be immune from First Amendment challenge.  And
speech that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by that Amend-
ment would be silenced.”68
Notwithstanding these justifications, the Second Circuit observed
that its holding was seemingly at odds with those of at least two other
federal jurisdictions: the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. District Court of
Maryland.69  At this point, then, it is perhaps worthwhile to examine the
full array of authorities assembled in both camps of this dispute—which
is not so herculean a task, considering that these may be counted on one
hand!
Prior to its being vacated by the Second Circuit, the E.D.N.Y.’s TJS
decision lent its voice to a small choir of authority crooning for time-of-
enactment without any rejoinder coming from the opposing side.70  The
E.D.N.Y. verdict relied specifically upon two such prior cases.71  The
first, Daytona Grand v. City of Daytona Beach, did not squarely address
the timeframe question, but the Eleventh Circuit presumed the applicabil-
ity of a time-of-enactment framework by noting without elaboration that
“the number of sites available for adult businesses under the new zoning
regime must be greater than or equal to the number of adult businesses in
existence at the time the new zoning regime takes effect.”72
The second authority invoked by the E.D.N.Y., Bigg Wolf Discount
Video Movie Sales v. Montgomery County, offered the most in-depth
treatment of the timeframe issue prior to the Second Circuit’s interven-
tion.73  Unlike in Daytona Grand, the parties in Bigg Wolf actively dis-
puted the relevant timeframe for assessing the adequacy of alternative
sites.74  In upholding the zoning law, the District of Maryland resolved
67 Id. (emphasis omitted).
68 Id. at 26.
69 See id. at 24.
70 See TJS of N.Y. v. Town of Smithtown, No. 03CV4407, 2008 WL 2079044, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008), vacated, 598 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2010).
71 See id. at *7 (citing Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 870
(11th Cir. 2007); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales v. Montgomery Cnty., Md. 256 F.
Supp. 2d 385, 395 (D. Md. 2003)).
72 Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 870 (emphasis added) (quoting Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of
Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Bigg Wolf, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
74 See id.
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the aforesaid dispute by embracing time-of-enactment, observing: “The
situation will always be fluid, with businesses moving in and out, and the
courts should not be involved repeatedly with litigation determining the
validity of a zoning ordinance.”75  The court then claimed that
“[a]lthough many courts have not explicitly said so, most have logically
analyzed the number of available sites in relation to the number of adult
businesses that would need to relocate at the time the ordinance is
passed.”76  In support of this proposition, the court cited and quoted from
a Northern District of Alabama case, Ranch House v. Amerson, which
contains the following language: “The test is whether the restrictions al-
low for reasonable alternative avenues of communication currently, not
whether they always will allow for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication.”77
Against this authority, the Second Circuit’s time-of-challenge posi-
tion is buttressed by at least one other source—unacknowledged in the
TJS opinion—namely a 2009 case from the Illinois Appellate Court.78
Predating the Second Circuit’s TJS by several months, this case offered
the first rebuttal to the thin time-of-enactment monopoly.  Therein, the
Illinois court harshly assailed the reasoning of Bigg Wolf and the
E.D.N.Y.’s TJS (then good law) for being fatally unsound79 and sug-
gested that both were premised on “a fundamental and inexplicable mis-
reading” of Ranch House (the Northern District of Alabama case).80  As
the Illinois Appellate Court read that decision, “Ranch House was clearly
concerned with ‘the availability of alternate avenues of communication
in the here-and-now,’ not in the past.”81  In other words, argued the Illi-
nois court, by crafting its test to discern whether a law “currently” pre-
served sufficient alternative sites, the Northern District of Alabama could
75 Id. at 397.
76 Id.
77 Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2001), rev’d in
part, vacated in part, 85 F. App’x 191 (11th Cir. 2003).  The District of Maryland also cited,
without elaboration, Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1532–33 (9th
Cir. 1993) for its proposition that most courts have implicitly embraced time-of-enactment.
See Bigg Wolf, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 397.  However, as the Second Circuit noted in TJS:
[T]he language of Topanga—which considered the alternatives available to adult
businesses that are ‘now in operation’—is fully consistent with the approach we take
here, which, as we have emphasized, may well permit courts also to consider an
ordinance’s constitutionally at the time it is passed.  Because Topanga found that the
challenged ordinance did not provide adequate alternatives at the time it was passed,
the court did not find it necessary to consider whether it also failed to provide ade-
quate alternatives at some later date.
TJS of N.Y. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 2010).  Accordingly, I exclude
Topanga from my analysis of the authorities that have weighed in on this issue.
78 See Cnty. of Du Page v. Lake St. Spa, Inc., 916 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
79 See id. at 1247–49.
80 Id. at 1248.
81 Id. (quoting Ranch House, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP205.txt unknown Seq: 14 18-APR-14 14:46
500 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:487
not possibly have meant historically; rather, that court intended precisely
what the plain meaning of “currently” denotes: contemporaneous with
the litigation process.82
To the extent that the District of Maryland was invoking Ranch
House to dispel the proposition that an ordinance’s constitutionality must
be evaluated based on whether it will always ensure adequate alternative
avenues, Ranch House’s use of “currently” harmonizes with Bigg Wolf’s
purposes because an ordinary definition of that word indeed implies ref-
erence to the present moment at the exclusion of any points in the fu-
ture.83 Bigg Wolf’s mistake, however, was its assumption that
“currently” therefore had to connote “historically,” at the time of enact-
ment—which, as the Illinois Appellate Court points out, is equally inap-
posite to the plain meaning of the term.  In other words, Bigg Wolf
glimpsed the interpretive question through the prism of a nonexistent di-
chotomy: that constitutionality must be determined either at the moment
of enactment or else based upon whether the ordinance appears hardy
enough to withstand any and all prospective challenges ad infinitum.  In
truth, however, as the Illinois Appellate Court exposed,84 Ranch House
stands for the proposition that the constitutional assessment should be
made at the time of each challenge, on the basis of currently existing
realities yet with full knowledge that those realities might someday shift
so as to permit a fresh constitutional attack.85
Such is the current status of the timeframe debate.  Most jurisdic-
tions have yet to weigh in on this issue, and thus the extent to which TJS
will find acceptance remains unclear.  Yet perhaps, at first blush, it
would appear as though Bigg Wolf’s fatal misreading of Ranch House
has deflated our jurisdictional squabble—and that time-of-challenge
should carry the day.  Upon further contemplation, however, discomfi-
ture remains: for must a zoning ordinance’s constitutionality really be
placed at the mercy of supra-governmental forces, i.e., those beyond the
command of the state?  Such is the implication of the time-of-challenge
position.
After all, the specific concern voiced by the Ranch House plaintiff,
which prompted the Northern District of Alabama to foray into its
timeframe discourse in the first place, was that the contested ordinance
“[did] not contain sufficient safeguards . . . against the ‘purposeful en-
croachment’ of churches, schools, and private residences that would
82 See id.
83 See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 151 (2nd ed. 1989).
84 See Du Page, 916 N.E.2d at 1247–48.
85 To corroborate this interpretation of Ranch House, the curious reader is urged to ex-
amine that court’s timeframe discussion in its entirety. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson,
146 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1212–13 (N.D. Ala. 2001).
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‘knock-out’ adult entertainment establishments” due to the law’s spacing
requirements.86  It was expressly in response to this concern—over the
consequent behavior of private actors—that the Ranch House court en-
gaged in its timeframe discussion.87  And it was indeed that very lan-
guage from Ranch House—assuaging its plaintiff’s concern by
announcing a model of volatile constitutionality—that was so readily
embraced by the Illinois Appellate Court as correlative with the time-of-
challenge view.88  The Second Circuit likewise endorsed this volatile ar-
rangement when Judge Calabresi observed how an ordinance’s constitu-
tionality might ebb and flow with the shifting availability of qualifying
sites.89  Yet this model extinguishes any hope of repose for a municipal-
ity’s well-intentioned statutes and, more alarmingly, empowers as cali-
brator of the scale a host of private actors whose activities lie beyond the
government’s reach.  Is such an arrangement truly optimal, much less
mandated by the First Amendment?  The focus of this Note will now
shift into a theoretical analysis of this question.
II. NEGATIVE THEORY AS A MODE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
A. Doctrinal Underpinnings
At the outset, several observations should guide how we approach
the constitutional text.  First, judicial decision-making impacts the lives
of civic actors in a way that is more burdensome than other governmental
mechanisms, due to its inherently “retroactive” effects.90  This retroactiv-
ity—which necessarily imposes obligations on civic actors after the leg-
islative fact—makes it especially difficult for those affected to reorder
their activities to conform with the new rule.91  To militate against this
phenomenon, Professor Ronald Cass encourages courts “to use interpre-
tive methods that maximize the predictability of judicial decisions.”92
Achieving such a result in a non-arbitrary manner, however, requires
courts to adopt a decision-making model that is grounded by “some real-
istic anchor in the constitutional text and initial constitutional intent.”93
86 Id. at 1212.
87 See id. at 1212–13.
88 See Du Page, 916 N.E.2d at 1247–48.
89 See TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. R
90 Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1317, 1350 (1988).
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1351.  Negative theory construes “intent” in a narrow and empirically reliable
sense, urging courts to focus on the more historically ascertainable “initial problems with
which the constitution-makers were concerned, rather than on the aspirations that may have
informed any of the drafters.” Id. (emphasis omitted).  Compare this advantage with the flim-
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In sum, an interpretive approach that is anchored in some original
constitutional reality is necessary for minimizing the caprice that other-
wise inheres to constitutional adjudication.94  And, to the extent that one
concedes the utility of an interpretive mode anchored in some original
reality, I argue that the so-called “negative theory” emerges as an attrac-
tive option.95  Notice here that I am using the un-technical phrase “origi-
nal reality” to convey a generalized preference for an originalist outlook,
without specifically hitching the wagon to any of the nuanced species
identified by Professor Jack Balkin: “original public meaning,” “original
intent,” and “original application.”96  These terms are linked by a com-
mon denominator, namely a conscientiousness toward the constitutional
text vis-à-vis some original reality existing at the time of its inception
(whether it be, respectively, the plain meaning of the words, the specific
intent of the Framers, or the popular understanding of how the words
would be applied).97  Most importantly, each breed aspires to the deci-
sive virtue for our purposes: the assurance of interpretive stability.98
Professor Frederick Schauer, whose scholarship first applied nega-
tive theory to the First Amendment,99 describes the dichotomy between
siness of positive theories, which place all of their eggs into the lone basket of some normative
ideal and thereby detach the inquiry from its historical anchor. See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1987).
94 See Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1350–51. R
95 See id. at 1352.  In Subsection B of this Part, I explore why negative theory aptly
accounts for these “original realities.”
96 Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Original Application, BALKINIZATION (June
23, 2005), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/original-meaning-and-original.html.
97 See id.
98 Addressing the comparative merits of these approaches is beyond the scope of this
Note; it suffices to observe that putting originalism into practice is a tricky endeavor. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989) (“[I]t is
often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.  Properly
done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material—in the case of the
Constitution and its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the records of
the ratifying debates in all the states.  Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the relia-
bility of that material—many of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought
to be quite unreliable.  And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and
intellectual atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have
which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and
loyalties that are not those of our day.  It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the
historian than the lawyer.”).
99 See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 81 (“[I]f the regulation of speech is R
either less efficient or more likely to produce unpleasant side-effects than the regulation of
other forms of conduct, then a Free Speech Principle will emerge by negative implication.”);
Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 17, at 14–15; Frederick Schauer, Cu- R
ban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 780 (1985) (“[T]he focus of the first amendment is on the motiva-
tions of the government.”); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 N.W. U. L. REV.
1284, 1301 (1983) (arguing that “the dangers of excess governmental regulation are a self-
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positive and negative conceptions of liberty as follows: a positive justifi-
cation for a right is grounded in notions of “why the activity covered by
the particular right is especially valuable, and therefore deserving of spe-
cial protection.”100  In contrast, a negative justification does not focus on
the intrinsic value of the protected activity itself but rather on the pecu-
liar dangers attaching to the improper regulation of it.101  As Schauer
explains, “[such an] argument is negative in the sense that it highlights
evils rather than goods.”102
Positive interpretations of the First Amendment deem speech wor-
thy of protection by identifying a particular positive value that free
speech serves to promote or safeguard.103  Conversely, the driving con-
cern for negative theorists to justify protecting free speech is skepticism
over the government’s capacity to not abuse its regulatory function.104
Thus, negative theorists frame their approach to the First Amendment
right—and inform their understanding of what ought to be protected
sufficient justification” for protecting free speech, “without [us] having to resort to notions of
self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization”).
100 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 80. R
101 Id.  Negative rights theory builds upon the famous distinction between positive and
negative liberty sketched by political theorist Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts
of Liberty (1958), in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 118–22 (1969) (pioneering this dichot-
omy and defining a negative conception of political liberty as “the area within which a man
can act unobstructed by others”).  As one scholar notes, “Berlin’s dichotomy between positive
and negative liberty sharpens First Amendment analysis by distinguishing between a positive
question (What does freedom of speech allow us to do?) and a negative question (What does
the freedom of speech protect us from?).”  Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of
Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 86–87 (1994). But see Ronald Dwor-
kin, Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog’s Approach, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 255–56 (2001)
(criticizing as “flat” Berlin’s conception of liberty).
102 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 80. R
103 See id. at 81.  See generally Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 676–88 (1991) (surveying various positive theories that
have been advanced to justify why speech is entitled to special protection, including: “truth
theory,” which conceptualizes the protection of speech as a way of maximizing the opportuni-
ties for listeners to discern truth (however understood) amidst the bustling marketplace of
ideas; “democracy theory,” which considers the exercise of free speech as essential for the
healthy functioning of a democratic system; and “self-expression” or “self-realization theory,”
which justifies protecting free speech by the important role it plays in facilitating individual
self-fulfillment).  Some scholars, however, critique both positive and negative theories, con-
tending that it is impossible to arrive at any single justification for bestowing speech with
special protection. See Daniel A. Faber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1617–27 (1986) (surveying the shortcomings of the
various positive theories and arguing for the nonexistence of a singular principle justifying the
free speech right); Lawrence A. Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech
Principle, 78 N.W. U. L. REV. 1319, 1346–52 (1983) (same).
104 See Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 17, at 15–16; Williams, R
supra note 103, at 693; see also Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and R
the Value of Self-Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2003) (“Speech value and its furtherance of
universal autonomy become minor if not neglected factors in [the negative theory] analysis.”
(citing Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80
IOWA L. REV. 51, 86 (1994))).
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under that rubric—by assuming ab initio a high risk that regulatory offi-
cials will abuse their power.105
Two common tendencies of human nature corroborate this prospect
for abuse: first, regulation can be tainted by the personal biases and self-
interest of the censors themselves.106  Professor Schauer notes that regu-
latory officials might develop biases in favor of, or against, certain forms
of speech for a variety of different reasons, foremost among which is the
basic desire to retain their power.107  Take, for example, the branding of
speech as “seditious,” where a determination of the proscription’s scope
must necessarily be made by those who, as agents of the incumbent re-
gime, are the intended targets of the controlled expression.108  In such a
context, regulatory officials might be tempted to draw the line of prohibi-
tion far more generously than they would if acting behind a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance.  Negative theorists label regulation stemming from
such parochial interests as “illegitimate” and would thus extend First
Amendment coverage to speech that is likely to fall prey to such
abuse.109
The second proclivity that underlies negative theory’s distrust of
government motives is the natural human desire for unanimity or consen-
sus, which yields an “urge toward intolerance” on the part of regula-
tors.110  Schauer quotes the famous observation of Justice Holmes on this
point: “If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law
and sweep away all opposition.”111  While this threat attaches to all
spheres of government regulation, Schauer suggests that it is most pro-
nounced with regard to speech because of the unique impact that speech
can have on shaping political and social ideas.112  Negative theorists
would thus confer special protection on speech that is particularly sus-
ceptible to this procrustean impulse, such as speech voicing political
dissent.113
105 See Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1354; see also Williams, supra note R
103, at 692. R
106 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 81–82; see also Cass, Commercial Speech, R
supra note 90, at 1354. R
107 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 81–82. R
108 See id. at 81.
109 See Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1354. R
110 Williams, supra note 103, at 692; see also SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at R
82; Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1354. R
111 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 82 (quoting Holmes). R
112 See id. at 82–83.
113 See id. at 83.
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There is no question that negative theory relies for its cogency upon
a pessimistic portrait of human nature.114  The doctrine builds off of a
distrust in the judgment of regulators to make “particularistic, case-sensi-
tive determinations regarding what forms of activity will promote the
search for truth and what forms will not.”115  But does this cynicism
necessarily render the theory relativistic in its conception of what posi-
tive values can derive from speech?  Professor Schauer’s analysis sug-
gests not: negative theory is animated not by a belief that speech fails to
secure positive goods but rather by the more threshold premise that the
government is not the most competent agent to discern what those goods
are.116  To use the example of truth-promotion: negative theory’s hesita-
tion to entrust regulators with the task of identifying what forms of
speech are conducive to “truth” reflects the doctrine’s preference for al-
lowing other, nongovernmental entities to parse out the content and
boundaries of the subject.117
The effect of this theoretical shift—glimpsing speech through a
prism that does not champion it affirmatively for what it achieves—
might appear strange as applied to one of the American polity’s most
hallowed entitlements: pegging the legal worth of this cherished right to
a phenomenon so sapped of romanticism as the menace of overregulation
seems almost to dilute it.  Yet negative theorists are simply responding to
the untenable fluidity of positive alternatives, which convert the Consti-
tution into a reflection pool wherein viewers observe only that which
they most want to see.  By justifying the protection of speech “without
114 One analysis suggests that this pessimism can be traced to the philosophy of Edmund
Burke. See Werhan, supra note 101, at 95.  In a complimentary vein to this pessimism is R
Professor Vincent Blasi, who, in sketching his positive justification for free speech rooted in
the so-called “checking value,” observes that “[a] premise underlying the checking value is an
essentially pessimistic view of human nature and human institutions.”  Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 541 (1977).  De-
spite being a positive justification for speech, Blasi’s checking value thesis accords with nega-
tive theory at least insofar as it places a primary emphasis on the special dangers of
government abuse. See id. at 538. But see Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at R
1343–44 (critiquing Blasi’s checking value thesis from the perspective of negative theory).
115 Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 17, at 15–16; see also R
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 83 (“The hypothesis here is that ‘slippery slope’ and R
‘where do you draw the line?’ arguments may have special relevance with respect to regulating
speech.”); Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communica-
tive Manner and the First Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1339, 1388 (2002).
116 See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 34 (expressing skepticism regarding the R
government’s capacity to distinguish truths from falsity rather than arguing that no ascertaina-
ble truths exist); see also Kitrosser, supra note 115, at 1387 (“[Negative] theory posits, in R
short, that surrendering to the government the power to pick and choose between the substan-
tive worthiness or unworthiness, and hence fitness or unfitness for legal protection, of particu-
lar instances of expression, leaves little principled basis to distinguish between ‘correct’ and
‘incorrect’ government choices as to what may be expressed.”).
117 See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 34. But see Alexander & Horton, supra R
note 103, at 1332. R
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having to resort to notions of self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-
realization,”118 negative theory sets its baseline much lower but is more
secure in its footing; and thereby, the theory achieves interpretive
stability.
B. Historical Realities that Render Negative Theory Optimal for
Constitutional Analysis
We have presented a descriptive account of negative First Amend-
ment theory—but now we must ask: is it normatively sound for our pur-
poses?  Professor Cass, a leading proponent of negative theory, contends
that the theory is an optimal mode of interpretation because the Framers
themselves were negatively oriented in their concerns when drafting the
Constitution.119
Historical experience corroborates negative theory’s core assump-
tion: that a government left to its own devices tends to abuse its regula-
tory power.120  A venerable lineage of political philosophy echoes this
empirical finding.121  Even apart from cases of iniquitous motives, and in
spheres where some intervention is concededly necessary, the plain real-
ity is that even well-intentioned government actors fall prey to the temp-
tation of regulatory overkill.122  Such abuse presents two serious causes
for concern.  First, the societal impact of government activity far exceeds
that of private action, thereby amplifying the harm wrought by abusive
regulatory measures.123  Second, because the government is a unique
vessel of public trust, regulatory malfeasance can compromise its politi-
cal legitimacy.124
This fear of regulatory abuse was among the primary motivations of
the Constitution’s Framers.125  The Framers were well-acquainted with
the vast corpus of philosophical thought cautioning against the misuse of
power;126 they also possessed firsthand knowledge from living under
British tyranny.  The political pamphlets circulating in the Colonies dur-
118 Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, supra note 99, at 1300–01; see also Cass, Perils, R
supra note 93, at 1440–41 (expressing skepticism that the Constitution’s substantive con- R
straints on federal power can be distilled into any generally agreed-upon, positive conception
of liberty).
119 See Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1449. R
120 See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 16, at 81; Blasi, supra note 114, at 540. R
121 See Blasi, supra note 114, at 529 (surveying, inter alia, the works of Aristotle, Mon- R
tesquieu, and John Stuart Mill and remarking how “[t]he tendency of officials to abuse their
public trust is a theme that has permeated political thought from classical times to the pre-
sent”); see also Werhan, supra note 101, at 94 (linking negative theory with Edmund Burke’s R
call for limited government).
122 See Werhan, supra note 101, at 90. R
123 See Blasi, supra note 114, at 538–39. R
124 See id. at 540.
125 See Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1439–40. R
126 See Blasi, supra note 114, at 532. R
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ing the Revolution reveal a fixation with developing methods to neutral-
ize government’s “essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its endlessly
propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries.”127
These same concerns lingered post-independence, such that “[t]he First
Amendment was an outgrowth of this body of thought.”128  James
Madison, the First Amendment’s architect,129 explicitly criticized the
British analogue of freedom of the press because it did not protect
against seditious libel and thereby evinced a naı̈ve confidence in the fair-
mindedness of the regime.130  In contrast to this, Madison observed how
“[i]n the United States, the executive magistrates are not held to be infal-
lible, nor the legislatures to be omnipotent.”131  A similar view is re-
flected in the writings of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.132  For
example, in a letter to Madison, Jefferson revealingly labeled the Bill of
Rights as “the text whereby to try all the acts of the federal
government.”133
The Framers were thus motivated by negative-style concerns when
crafting the dividing lines between proper and improper government in-
trusion.  The men who debated and ratified the First Amendment shaped
their understanding of what sort of regulation qualified as “presump-
tively illegitimate” from their experience with press licensing and sedi-
tious libel under British tyranny.134  As Cass observes, the forms of
intrusion regarded as particularly suspect were those which clearly impli-
cated a “potential for speech regulation to be shaped by the personal
interests of the officials exercising regulatory authority” or which in-
volved a “significant likelihood that the regulation systematically would
discriminate against ideas that were disliked for reasons not strongly re-
lated to any consequential concern separate from concern that acceptance
of the ideas might increase.”135
The key point, as Cass notes, is that the Founders were animated by
motive-oriented concerns.136  The early deliberations over government’s
127 Id. at 533 (quoting from an exhaustive study of colonial political pamphlets conducted
by Professor Bernard Bailyn) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 535.
130 See id. at 536 (citing Madison).
131 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Madison) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 See id. at 537.  For a further discussion of Jefferson’s views on this subject, see Cass,
Perils, supra note 93, at 1444–45 & n.124. R
133 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 164 (1988).
134 Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1354. R
135 Id.; see also Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1449–50 (“[P]ast incidents of wrongful R
suppression or punishment of speech had been born of officials’ intolerance: distaste for the
message rather than realistic concern for its practical effects.  This sort of intolerance for ideas
accounted for much of the censorship that governments had effected.”).
136 See Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1352 (“The root concern for first R
amendment prohibitions on abridgment of speech and press freedom is official bias. . . .  [T]he
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proper purview “emphasize[d] not the need to proscribe generally gov-
ernment interference with personal liberty . . . but the need to curb
wrongful interference.”137  Likewise, the Bill of Rights emerged from a
desire among skeptical states for a mechanism to restrain the federal gov-
ernment from going too far.138  According to one historian, “[t]he Fram-
ers intended the First Amendment as an added assurance that Congress
would be limited to the exercise of its enumerated powers and therefore
they phrased it as an express prohibition against the possibility that Con-
gress might use those powers to abridge freedom of speech or press.”139
How, then, do the abovementioned historical realities render nega-
tive theory an optimal mode of constitutional interpretation?  To answer
this question, we ought to consider the socio-historical realities that in-
here to the process of constitution formation itself.  First, because a con-
stitution is the product of multifarious (and often divergent)
viewpoints—all converging for the sake of a common enterprise—the
constitution formation process necessarily involves the watering-down of
the drafters’ individual concerns into their broadest forms to achieve con-
sensus.  As a result, “[t]he substantive prohibitions . . . are not the tri-
umph of any [single] philosophy.”140  Instead, the need for dispute
resolution renders a constitutional document “more focused on process
than . . . on substance.”141  Moreover, insofar as substantive provisions
like the First Amendment are included, “they are likely themselves to be
abstractions from particular concerns.”142
These realities of constitution formation, and the etiology of sub-
stantive provisions contained therein, “suggest[ ] a narrower focus than
most positive theories of speech.”143  The most that can be said of the
Founders’ unitary intentions—the least common denominator—is, as
Cass asserts, a united concern over the menace of tyranny.144  It is in this
context that Cass urges for an interpretive model “focus[ing] on the ini-
speech and press clauses reflect the constitution-makers’ concerns that, absent some constitu-
tional constraint, (federal) officials would overregulate expression.”); see also Schauer, The
Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 17, at 2 (“Not only the first amendment, but also the R
very idea of a principle of freedom of speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of
decisionmakers.  Once we understand this, we are able to understand as well that the first
amendment is not the reflection of a society’s highest aspirations, but rather of its fears . . . .”).
137 Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1439–40; accord Blasi, supra note 114, at 538. R
138 See LEVY, supra note 133, at 163. R
139 Id. at 209; see also Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1441–42 (“The phrasing of the R
amendments in the negative—as limitations on government rather than as self-contained guar-
antees of liberty—is emblematic of their genesis.”).
140 Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1442–43. R
141 Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1348. R
142 Id.
143 Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1443. R
144 See id.
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tial problems with which the constitution-makers were concerned, rather
than on the aspirations that may have informed any of the drafters.”145
Given these historical realities, which illustrate the prevalence of
negative concerns in the Framers’ unitary mindset—and given, as as-
serted above, the benefits of pegging our interpretive approach to some
original reality of the Constitution’s inception—negative theory emerges
as a legitimate and optimal mode of First Amendment interpretation.146
Negative theory provides a constructive response to the need for interpre-
tive stability by eliminating the quandary that the interpreter is otherwise
faced with: namely, whose justifying values ought we to impute into the
document’s provisions?  Negative theory escapes this predicament by an-
swering the question in the only way that is defensible from an objective
perspective: those of the document’s designers, which can only be extra-
polated in the broadest of strokes.  In short, then, to the extent that we
aspire to anchor our interpretive approach in some original constitutional
reality, negative theory is ideal for the task.
III. APPLYING NEGATIVE THEORY TO THE TIMEFRAME DEBATE AND
EMPLOYING THAT FRAMEWORK TO SUGGEST A BLUEPRINT
FOR PRESERVING MUNICIPAL ZONING RIGHTS
A. Applying Negative Principles to the Timeframe Question
Having shown negative theory to be an optimal mode of constitu-
tional analysis,147 we are now justified in applying its principles to re-
solve the issue at stake in TJS, namely whether the relevant timeframe
for assessing alternative avenues should be at the time of enactment or at
the time of challenge.148  As argued below, Renton and its progeny are
classic products of a negative understanding of the First Amendment
right.  This Note further contends that upon applying negative principles
to this issue, the interpreter is led to favor the time-of-enactment
approach.
In applying negative theory to this question, we are not left purely
to conjecture: many commentators have suggested that, in practice, the
judiciary already relies on negative principles to adjudicate a wide vari-
ety of other First Amendment questions.149  For example, in crafting its
145 Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1351 (emphasis omitted). R
146 See Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1449 (“Because the conceptions of the framers were R
negatively oriented, the unifying, abstract concept of freedom of speech must be defined as
freedom from the sorts of official speech restraints that seemed problematic.”).
147 See supra Part II.B.
148 See supra Part I.B.
149 See Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50
HASTINGS L. J. 309, 311 (1999) (referencing the Supreme Court’s “apparently operative nega-
tive theory of free speech”); Morant, supra note 104, at 5 (“The . . . judicial adherence to a R
negative theory [has] ensure[d] the failure of most restrictions on the media’s expressive
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prior restraint doctrine, the Court sanctions restrictive means in “only the
rarest circumstances”150 and often denies the government such a preroga-
tive where the likelihood of regulatory self-interest or intolerance is par-
ticularly high.151  Conversely, courts will usually permit controversial
speech restraints that include mechanisms curbing the personal discretion
of enforcement agents.152  Another First Amendment arena where nega-
tive theory has influenced the judicial approach is that of hate speech
ordinances: one analysis of the Court’s landmark decision in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul observes how, in safeguarding the right to express odious
forms of speech, the Court did not attempt to justify its ruling by identi-
fying a positive value attaching to such a right but was instead simply
reacting against clear-cut content discrimination by city officials.153
From these contexts, a broad trend is discernible: negative theory
prompts courts to balance the social harm the regulation purports to ad-
dress against the likelihood of regulatory impropriety.154  Underlying this
procedure is a quest to uncover whether the government is acting with
proper motives.  The regulating entity bears the burden of advancing a
rationale that justifies its intervention on grounds other than aversion to
the speech itself.155
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Renton adheres to this balancing
framework.156  By defining content neutrality as that which can be “justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech,”157 the
Court identifies the scienter behind the zoning law as the key constitu-
tional concern.158  In other words, the judicial inquiry focuses on the
rights.”); Werhan, supra note 101, at 91 (“I contend that the negative perspective of the First R
Amendment has played the dominant role in shaping the Court’s recent approach to free
speech problems. . . .”); see also Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1416 (observing how positive, R
value-promoting theories of free speech “have not predicted judicial opinions very well”).
150 Morant, supra note 104, at 28 (identifying the prior restraint doctrine as “[p]erhaps the R
most significant and effective manifestation of the judiciary’s negative approach”).
151 See Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1482 (citing several prior restraint cases). R
152 See id. at 1482–83.
153 See Werhan, supra note 101, at 92; see also Morant, supra note 104, at 27 (citing and R
concurring with Werhan’s analysis).
154 See Cass, Perils, supra note 93, at 1473. R
155 Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 90, at 1352–53. R
156 But see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
177 n.35 (1990) (expressing skepticism about whether negative theory provides the sole expla-
nation of why courts employ the content-based/content-neutral distinction); Williams, supra
note 103, at 694 (noting the Supreme Court’s “consistent refusal in the free speech context to R
examine the types of evidence (such as legislative history and common sense) that would
allow one to determine actual motive”).
157 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Va. Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
158 See Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex, But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning,
the First Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 630
(2005).
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mindset of the lawmaker rather than on the (positive) entitlement of the
restricted speaker.  Furthermore, by determining content neutrality based
on the cogency of the secondary effects that the law is responding to,159
Renton instructs courts to gauge the genuineness of a municipality’s in-
tentions: secondary effects which are insufficiently harmful to outweigh
the speech right suggest themselves to be a smokescreen for illegitimate
regulatory motives.
This motive-oriented framework extends to the alternative avenues
analysis because the sole judicial concern is whether the law denies adult
entertainment businesses a reasonable opportunity to operate.160  The ec-
onomic feasibility of alternative sites is irrelevant precisely because the
Constitution is not concerned with whether, in practical effect, the law
precludes affected businesses from actually persisting in operation.161
Likewise, it is not dispositive if the only type of sites left available are
functionally undesirable,162 or if an ordinance preserves less than one
percent of land within the municipality.163  The inquiry is focused exclu-
sively on motive.  And moreover, the concern is on the government’s
motive: the intentions of private actors are of no import, even if their
behavior overtly evinces a discriminatory attitude toward the purveyed
speech.164
The ultimate corollary of these tenets—that the alternative avenues
requirement really imposes an obligation to furnish theoretical, as op-
posed to de facto, space165—is hence the offspring of negative princi-
ples.  It is therefore unsurprising that the sole caveat to this limited
requirement is an implied expectation of good faith on the part of the
ordinance-drafter.166  Such a command essentially functions as a proxy
to divine rectitude of intent: for example, courts will reject an ordinance
if the spacing requirements imposed by that very law vitiate the actual
availability of the proposed alternative sites167—an oversight that
smacks of disingenuousness.  Likewise, courts might examine “the goals
of the city plan” to assess whether the alternative sites are sufficient to
constitute a “reasonable opportunity.”168  Why would such a factor as the
159 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
160 See id. at 54.
161 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. R
162 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. R
163 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. R
164 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. R
165 See Baradaran-Robison, supra note 56, at 479 n.147. See also supra note 56 and R
corresponding text.
166 See supra note 59 and corresponding text. R
167 See Isbell v. City of San Diego, 258 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001); Univ. Books &
Videos, Inc. v. Miami–Dade Cnty., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011, 1018 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
168 Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 822 (9th Cir. 2000).
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city’s overarching planning goals enter into the analysis, if not to police
for ulterior motivation?
In sum, the alternative avenues jurisprudence shaped by Renton and
its progeny bears the deep imprint of negative theory.  We must now
apply these principles to the timeframe issue at stake in TJS, whereupon
we are compelled to embrace the time-of-enactment approach.  As the
Second Circuit’s TJS opinion reveals, the time-of-challenge position re-
lies on a fundamentally positive conception of the First Amendment right
for its normative appeal.  In the words of Judge Calabresi: “If the only
relevant question were whether an ordinance provided adequate alterna-
tives on the day of its passage, any law that did so would thereafter be
immune from First Amendment challenge.  And speech that the Supreme
Court has held to be protected by that Amendment would be si-
lenced.”169  This statement implicitly locates the starting point of the
analysis with the special value of the speech itself, not with the regulat-
ing entity—an inversion demanded by a positive conception of the First
Amendment.  Moreover, by explicitly rejecting time-of-enactment be-
cause of its mere potential to silence protected speech, the court presup-
poses that the Amendment guarantees an actual, de facto venue for
covered forms of expression.  Presumably, then, the Second Circuit’s
view would impose on municipalities a continuing obligation to preserve
actual venues for communication, even if the situation on the ground
becomes transformed solely by the workings of private actors.170
The Second Circuit’s premise, however, is flatly at odds with the
consistently negative contours of Renton-influenced jurisprudence: since
the relevant concern is simply whether the government is acting with a
proper motive, the analysis must begin—and end—with the scienter of
the regulator, which is clinched as soon as the regulatory scheme is im-
posed.  The relevant constitutional window is, therefore, at the time of
enactment; the subsequent maneuverings of private actors are irrelevant
to the constitutional analysis,171 and the subsequent regulatory acts of the
municipality can be policed by applying the negative framework anew.
B. A Negative Blueprint for Enhancing the Municipal Zoning Power
How high are the stakes in this jurisdictional dispute?  Although
none of the cases make reference to any overarching philosophical
ramifications, the timeframe question in fact awakens a classic debate in
our political system: the competing alternatives are divided neatly along
majoritarian–counter-majoritarian lines.  A time-of-enactment regime
will, in practical effect, safeguard the majoritarian exercise of zoning
169 TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 2010).
170 See id. at 23.
171 See supra note 55 and corresponding text. R
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powers by bestowing popularly enacted legislation with validity and fi-
nality.  Consequently, the application of negative theory yields a
blueprint for championing the municipal zoning prerogative.
For definitional purposes: the majoritarian–counter-majoritarian di-
chotomy refers to an endemic tension that exists in our republic between
majority and minority coalitions as they compete to advance their politi-
cal interests through the apparatuses of government.172  Popularly elected
legislatures designedly advance the will of citizen-majorities, whereas
the judiciary exists to safeguard the rights of minority groups by exercis-
ing of judicial review.173  In any given policy sphere, the law tends to
apportion latitude of varying degrees amongst both of these forces; but
the fault-lines between them are ever active.
The zoning prerogative is a quintessential exertion of majoritarian
power because it represents an attempt by elected lawmakers to mold
local circumstances into what (presumably) the public desires them to
be.174  A time-of-challenge regime, however, severely undermines this
prerogative—and thus infringes upon the majoritarian will—by imposing
a state of affairs that we might call “volatile constitutionality.”  Consider
the fluid scenario endorsed by the court in TJS, wherein a law’s constitu-
tionality might ebb and flow with the emergence or decline of available
sites: a statute could be dislodged from its constitutionality upon the van-
ishing of enough such sites, whereas a hitherto unconstitutional ordi-
nance might be cured of its defect if additional sites emerge onto the
market.175  Professor Hans Linde provides a fuller illustration of this vol-
atile phenomenon, albeit in a context that is unrelated to the current
thesis:
[A] member of the 76th Congress presumably might
stand up in 1940 and demand to know whether H.R.
5138 was not a bill ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press’ contrary to the Constitution.  Constitutional
law, in its original function antecedent to judicial review,
owes him an answer.  The Congressman’s decision must
be constitutionally right or wrong, in that place and at
that time—not only a prosecutor’s, a jury’s, or a judge’s
decisions at the time of a later trial.  The answer the
172 For a good discussion of this dynamic, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2–4 (1971); Michael Klarman, What’s So
Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 160–63 (1998).
173 Judicial review is born out of a “distrust of the legislature.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 21 (1962).
174 The Supreme Court considers municipal zoning laws to be “an essential aspect of
achieving a satisfactory quality of life.”  Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68
(1981).
175 TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Congressman would get in 1940, of course, would be
that in 1925 the Supreme Court had held [in Gitlow v.
New York] that the New York legislature could reasona-
bly have believed in 1902 that advocacy of violent over-
throw of government was too dangerous to be permitted.
That theory . . . simply accepts a lawmaker’s judgment
of danger intrinsic in the content of such advocacy, quite
independent of any extrinsic conditions.  This answer
would not pretend to anticipate in 1940 the external dan-
gers in an atomic age that were invoked to sustain the act
of 1951, nor would it need to.  The Gitlow option was
disavowed in Dennis.  But is the answer Holmes and
Brandeis would give a member of the 76th Congress
more satisfactory—that it all depended on the circum-
stances; that the constitutionality of H.R. 5138 could be
determined only in the context of future eventualities of
clear and present danger which he might now be unable
to foresee; that the danger would justify his law to sup-
press revolutionary speech and organization might shift
from indigenous rampages to foreign military menaces
and back again, so that the bill presently before him for
enactment might well be unconstitutional now but might
be constitutional in the light of diverse events in 1945, in
1948, in 1951, in 1957, and in 1961, perhaps not in
1966, but again in 1968?176
Characteristic of this volatile model is the fleetingness of legislative
achievement; there lingers a debilitating uncertainty as to the permissible
bounds for popular action.177  And amidst such uncertainty, it becomes
especially difficult for valid, bona fide majoritarian processes to oper-
ate.178  This, then, is the chief sin of a time-of-challenge regime: that it
functionally cripples municipal lawmaking.  In contrast, negative theory
176 Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance in the Bran-
denburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1178 (1970).
177 This undesirable fluidity parallels the ever-evolving criteria of history, tradition, col-
lective conscience, and perceptions of “liberty and justice” that the Court has used to announce
the existence of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In determining which rights are fundamental, judges . . .
must look to the traditions and collective conscience of our people to determine whether a
principle is so rooted there as to be ranked as fundamental.” (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks and alterations omitted)).
178 By stretching the girth of the First Amendment right beyond its enumerated core, the
time-of-challenge regime mirrors other instances where courts have seen fit to abrogate popu-
larly enacted laws in the name of evanescent, dubiously situated substantive rights. See, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905) (vitiating a state’s law by announcing the
now-repudiated doctrine of economic substantive due process).
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ensures repose for permissible majoritarian action by drawing a firm line
in the constitutional sand: time-of-enactment, from whence the govern-
ment’s motives can be tested.  If the law proves not to have sprung from
iniquitous intent, then it is a valid fruit of the legislative process; and if it
be such, then the law should be undone only through the alike workings
of statutory devices.  Such an approach, apart from respecting the separa-
tion of powers, will curtail the judicial discovery of novel rights that are
dislodged from a tested understanding of the human good.179
Some scholars, including Professor Cass, might object to this thesis
and argue that negative principals instead favor counter-majoritarian in-
terests.180  One commentator observes, for instance, how negative theo-
rists “should be wary of ‘secondary effect’ justifications because of their
potential to mask government censorship.”181  Yet there is a valid dis-
tinction that ought to be drawn between courts (a) focusing on the propri-
ety of government motives and (b) simultaneously imposing a lenient
burden in the context of zoning by liberally construing negative secon-
dary effects.  The two are not rivalrous alternatives.  Negative theory
posits simply that courts should police for illegitimate regulatory mo-
tives—yet this hardly preordains the extent to which lawmakers might in
good faith construe which secondary effects are legitimately injurious to
society; nor, therefore, does negative theory foreclose the possibility that
such a conception be vast.182
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions have split over whether the constitutionality of a zon-
ing law that targets adult entertainment should be evaluated based on the
alternative avenues preserved at the time of its enactment or at the time
of challenge.  The Second Circuit became the highest authority to
squarely address this question in TJS of New York v. Town of Smithtown
and therein embraced time-of-challenge.183  Indeed, from the sparse pre-
179 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1974); cf. Lochner, 198
U.S. at 57; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923). See generally 3 JOHN
FINNIS, Human Rights and their Enforcement (1985), in HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMON GOOD:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 39 (2011); ERNEST L. FORTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, VIRTUE, AND THE COM-
MON GOOD 22–23 (1996); PIERRE MANENT, THE CITY OF MAN 138–39, 145 (Marc A. LePain
trans., 1998).
180 See Cass, supra note 90, at 1355–56; Werhan, supra note 101, at 90, 92–93. R
181 Werhan, supra note 101, at 93. R
182 Unlikely support for this proposition can be found in Schauer’s critics, who note with
displeasure how, in the First Amendment context, negative theory has the effect of equipping
the government with enormous regulatory power. See Alexander & Horton, supra note 103, at R
1332.
183 See TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 18–19 (2d Cir. 2010).
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cedent that exists, such a position appears to be the stronger.184  No
court, however, has considered the theoretical ramifications of each op-
tion; and in particular, the drawbacks of volatile constitutionality have
been wholly missed.
Undergirding the time-of-challenge position is an implicitly positive
conception of the free speech right, which is analytically out of synch
with the negative-influenced jurisprudence that has emerged in the wake
of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.  The Renton test demands merely
that adult entertainment businesses be afforded a “reasonable opportu-
nity” to exist.185  As such, the alternative avenues requirement is best
construed not as a de facto-focused mandate that demands a set quantity
of actual sites but rather as compelling only the preservation of theoreti-
cal space.
By thus applying, as we ought to, negative principles to resolve the
question at hand, we are led to favor a time-of-enactment regime.  Nega-
tive theory premises the need for protecting free speech solely on the
special dangers attaching to the government’s improper regulation of
it.186  Conducting the constitutional inquiry at the time of enactment suf-
fices for us to inspect the government’s interest and thereby gauge its
motives in so regulating.  Moreover, a time-of-enactment regime ensures
the integrity of majoritarian processes, which are imperiled by time-of-
challenge.  In sum, negative theory preserves the validity and finality of
popular laws and equips municipalities with an interpretive blueprint for
restrictively zoning adult entertainment businesses.
184 See supra Part I.B for a comprehensive analysis of the authorities on both sides of this
split.
185 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
186 See SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 80–81. R
